ID 159242308 | Sierra Leone ©
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After two ambitious Chinese-backed infrastructure projects were abandoned or stalled, Sierra Leone is turning to another Chinese partner to develop a “national” shipping industry. The financing model has changed, but familiar questions remain.
On 19 October, Sierra Leone inaugurated its new national shipping company, Sierra Leone Ocean Shipping Company (SLOSCO), with ambitions to operate, in time, 50 vessels and capture a significant share of the country’s maritime trade.
The venture is 70% owned by China’s Zhejiang Xiehai Group, with the remaining 30% held by the state-owned Sierra Leone National Shipping Agency (SLNSA).
The objective is straightforward: retain more of the freight earnings generated by Sierra Leone’s imports and mineral exports.
But the country has a history of ambitious Chinese-backed transport investments that failed to materialise.
Non-events
In November 2017, ICBC and China Eximbank agreed to finance a $659m expansion of Freetown’s Queen Elizabeth II Quay, backed by a sovereign guarantee.
The project’s financial viability was questionable. Its repayment structure depended partly on port-related revenues, potentially increasing costs for shipping lines and cargo owners.
The project stalled following the 2018 change of government.
In September 2026, an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed that ICBC had committed to financing before completing its due diligence. Subsequent compliance checks identified corruption allegations involving individuals connected to the developer.
ICBC ultimately decided not to disburse its financing, according to the investigation. The allegations were rejected by the developer’s representatives.
Another Chinese-backed project suffered a similar fate. In 2018, Sierra Leone cancelled the proposed $318m Mamamah International Airport after concluding that the investment was economically unjustifiable, particularly given the underutilisation of the existing airport.
Both cases demonstrated the risks of pursuing ambitious infrastructure development without sufficiently convincing commercial foundations.
Today?
SLOSCO is fundamentally different in one respect: it is structured as an equity joint-venture, rather than a sovereign-guaranteed infrastructure loan.
Xiehai is an established shipping operator with a fleet of 42 vessels and a commercial network. This potentially allows SLOSCO to enter the market without purchasing dozens of vessels or accumulating substantial public debt.
Yet the distinction between vessels actually owned by SLOSCO, those chartered from Xiehai, and ships merely managed commercially remains unclear.
More importantly, the Sierra Leone National Shipping Agency Act 2025 grants the national carrier discretionary rights concerning the transportation of 40% of the value of the country’s imports and exports.
That could be more commercially significant than the fleet itself.
But cargo value is not freight revenue, and statutory rights do not necessarily translate into actual shipping contracts. Much of Sierra Leone’s mineral trade involves international commodity buyers and exporters who may already control vessel nominations.
The question is whether SLOSCO can compete commercially or will depend on preferential access to cargo.
Illicit cargo?
At this point we have to also refer to the well-documented case of Dutch drug trafficker Jos Leijdekkers, who is Sierra Leone president Julius Bio, and who has established the country as a key hub in the transport of cocaine from South America to Europe.
These are not merely allegations – Dutch courts have sentenced Leijdekkers in absentia to over 100 years in prison for several murders, while this excellent Guardian report details the extraordinary lengths that he has gone to using established shipping routes (and companies, for shipping industry folk it’s a roll-call of household names and really is a must-read for anyone trying to understand how licit and illicit cargoes intersect) from Freetown to ship drugs to Europe.
Which means there is a possibility that the SLOSCO project could, in part, be an attempt to create a legitimate business to cover the doings of an illegitimate one…
But that aside…
Sierra Leone’s ambition to retain maritime earnings is understandable. However, freight revenues must cover vessel operating costs, charter hire, financing and insurance, while 70% of the company’s equity belongs to its Chinese partner.
The country may still benefit substantially through employment, taxes, dividends and maritime expertise.
For Sierra Leone, the decisive test will not be whether SLOSCO reaches 50 vessels or secures a statutory share of cargo. It will be whether the arrangement delivers competitive freight services, sustainable returns and measurable economic value for the country.
After the unfulfilled port expansion and the abandoned airport, Sierra Leone has an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from experience.
This time, the ships may already exist. The question is whether the business model can stand on its own.