Trump likes to test big ideas in real time, and very publicly. Earlier this week, Washington was prepared to surrender one of its most valuable bargaining chips with Saudi Arabia, without the conditions one would expect from American foreign policy.
For years, successive U.S. administrations treated domestic uranium enrichment as the one concession Riyadh could not have without paying a strategic price. Most recently, that cost was normalization with Israel. Two days ago, Trump was willing to simply give that leverage away for free as he grew increasingly desperate to regain control of a war that shouldn’t have been waged. But by late Thursday – one can imagine under immense Israeli pressure (which has already had an outsized impact on U.S. foreign policy in recent months) – the tone had changed, and normalization of relations with Israel was back on the table as a precondition to the Saudi nuclear deal.
The overriding problem here is that Trump can’t put the genie back in the bottle, and the world will pay the price for a long time to come.
The Iran war has made an Iranian bomb more likely than before, not less. The U.S. administration has failed to maintain control of the war with Iran, and the conflict has become almost entirely about the first major problem it created: control over Hormuz, which was not an issue before.
The only hope now is that Congress won’t approve what is essentially going to be the nuclearization of the Middle East, understanding…
Trump likes to test big ideas in real time, and very publicly. Earlier this week, Washington was prepared to surrender one of its most valuable bargaining chips with Saudi Arabia, without the conditions one would expect from American foreign policy.
For years, successive U.S. administrations treated domestic uranium enrichment as the one concession Riyadh could not have without paying a strategic price. Most recently, that cost was normalization with Israel. Two days ago, Trump was willing to simply give that leverage away for free as he grew increasingly desperate to regain control of a war that shouldn’t have been waged. But by late Thursday – one can imagine under immense Israeli pressure (which has already had an outsized impact on U.S. foreign policy in recent months) – the tone had changed, and normalization of relations with Israel was back on the table as a precondition to the Saudi nuclear deal.
The overriding problem here is that Trump can’t put the genie back in the bottle, and the world will pay the price for a long time to come.
The Iran war has made an Iranian bomb more likely than before, not less. The U.S. administration has failed to maintain control of the war with Iran, and the conflict has become almost entirely about the first major problem it created: control over Hormuz, which was not an issue before.
The only hope now is that Congress won’t approve what is essentially going to be the nuclearization of the Middle East, understanding that there are ways to prevent others (China and Russia) from stepping in to fill the nuclear void.
Trump cannot control a nuclear Saudi Arabia because he has already given away too much American leverage. Yes, this is transactional because it is intended to enrich American companies, which Trump also cannot control because this is not China and these companies answer to shareholders, not presidents. But it is also driven by the need to make a big splash for voters before November, and so far, there are only negatives to show for this wartime gamble.
Once enrichment infrastructure exists, no future U.S. president can realistically negotiate it away. Washington can reverse sanctions, cancel aid, or end defense agreements, but it won’t be able to dismantle a sovereign nuclear fuel cycle that it helped create.
Now, we find ourselves in a very contradictory position borne entirely out of legacy-chasing, political point-scoring, and zero consideration for the national interest. A war that was allegedly launched over Iran’s nuclear program has completely abandoned that element. Instead of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, the U.S. administration’s new policy can be simplified to this old adage: “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em”. So, instead, we will “remove” the Iranian nuclear threat by opening the door to a potential Saudi nuclear threat to deter Iran.
An eternally fragile region of the world cannot go nuclear.
Israel, of course, would prefer not to be surrounded by nuclear actors. And beyond that, a Saudi nuclear enrichment facility would be a primary target for Iran, which is also training its sites on the Kingdom’s energy facilities. It could become a war over nuclear facilities before either side has even built a bomb.
From a technical perspective, it’s also important to understand that the Saudis wouldn’t be starting from nuclear scratch if this deal is approved by Congress.
Saudi Arabia does not currently possess nuclear weapons, commercial nuclear power reactors, or a known facility capable of enriching uranium. But it has done all the groundwork, including building nuclear research and regulatory institutions. It is also developing a low-power research reactor and has explored domestic uranium deposits. It’s made it very clear that it intends to control more of the nuclear fuel cycle. It also possesses long-range Chinese-origin ballistic missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads. The Saudis are ready the minute they think Iran is close to having a nuclear weapon. Domestic enrichment is the missing capability.
And there are no safeguards in the American deal, which does not even require IAEA inspection authority. If it is legacy Trump is chasing here, then it will be as the man who nuclearized the Middle East.
As a sidebar, the Trump administration is negotiating one of the most consequential U.S.-Saudi agreements in decades while the Saudi government remains one of the Trump family’s largest private financial partners. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund invested $2 billion in Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners after he left the White House and continues to finance the firm as Washington moves forward with a 30-year civil nuclear agreement that gives U.S. companies a central role in the Kingdom’s nuclear program. The arrangement is expected to draw renewed scrutiny from ethics watchdogs and members of Congress as the deal moves through the review process.