On the question of whether the ASX replaces the AS3, the rotations point the other way. Together they give Hapag-Lloyd two weekly sailings into the same four Brazilian gateways, each fed from a different Chinese catchment – imitating how CMA CGM and its Ocean Alliance partners pair SEAS 2 and SEAS A.
Add the slots Hapag-Lloyd buys on Maersk’s ASAS, which still calls Buenos Aires and Montevideo direct, and the Hamburg-based line covers the trade three ways.
However, we cannot exclude that ASX could serve as a policy insurance, should Hapag and Zim part ways on their joint AS3/ZFS.
Read the rotation, not the press release
ASX runs a port rotation of Qingdao-Ningbo-Shekou-Tanjung Pelepas-Santos-Itajaí-Rio Grande-Paranaguá-Santos-Singapore. Five choices stand out.
It gathers westbound cargo at Tanjung Pelepas, while every rival on the trade uses Singapore. The two are 30 miles apart and interchangeable for a customer’s box, so this is not about the shipper; it is about which network ASX plugs into – which matters for a different reason, outlined below.
It skips Shanghai. ASX is the only Asia–ECSA service that does not call at the largest container port on the planet. This leads towards an engineered network to work with Gemini’s shuttles.
It calls at Itajaí before Paranaguá. Most services run Santos, then Paranaguá. Hapag-Lloyd puts Santa Catarina second on discharge and pushes Paranaguá to fourth, so Paranaguá imports arrive later while its exports, loaded late in the sweep, keep a fast run to Asia.
It places Rio Grande in the middle, not at an end. Rio Grande is usually first or last, marking it as an import or an export port. Here it is the turn of the loop and the single feeder pivot for Montevideo and Buenos Aires, so it has to sit mid-string to connect the River Plate both ways.
And it reaches north to Qingdao, while not having Hong Kong on the backhaul, and imports will be left to a Singapore relay. What its presence really tells us, is that ASX & AS3 are meant to stay side by side, offering a complete portfolio of corridors to Hapag customers.
The tight market has an expiry date
For shippers, the timing matters more than the branding. December removes the Maersk–CMA CGM ASAS2 loop and, by my count, nominal weekly capacity from Asia falls by about 6%.
In April, MSC replaces Hapag-Lloyd’s five ships on Ipanema with its own, and Hapag-Lloyd adds a whole new loop. At ship sizes like AS3’s, that is in the order of 10,000 teu a week of extra capacity, and enough to reverse December’s cut.
Therefore, shippers signing annual contracts this winter should not price December’s tighter market as permanent.
By the second quarter next year, the Asia-east coast South America trade will be split between at least four groups that each control their own ships: the Ocean Alliance members; MSC with ONE; Maersk; and Hapag-Lloyd with or without Zim.
That is a more competitive trade than the one these partnerships created, and it arrives just as contracts signed during the squeeze start to kick in.


