The U.S. launched another major round of strikes across Iran this week, targeting roughly 90 military sites, including coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile batteries, drone launch positions, command networks and IRGC naval assets around Hormuz.
Tehran responded within hours with missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar while insisting it will continue enforcing its own navigation regime through the Strait.
For Tehran, control of Hormuz is now the top strategic objective. Western intelligence assessments conclude that Tehran is prepared to accept renewed military escalation rather than relinquish control over commercial traffic through the strait.
Despite repeated U.S. strikes against coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile batteries, drone launch positions, and IRGC naval assets, Iran is not backing down on Hormuz. Commercial vessels that refuse to use Tehran’s designated transit routes are under attack, and military pressure is doing nothing to change that as of the time of writing.
At the same time, Iran is busily regrouping and restoring capabilities. U.S. officials now assess that Tehran has replaced portions of its coastal radar network, recovered or repaired hundreds of missiles and launchers damaged during the war, and regained access to more than half of its prewar missile inventory.
Iran lost its diplomatic game when Gulf states and Washington rejected its proposals to formalize…
The U.S. launched another major round of strikes across Iran this week, targeting roughly 90 military sites, including coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile batteries, drone launch positions, command networks and IRGC naval assets around Hormuz.
Tehran responded within hours with missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar while insisting it will continue enforcing its own navigation regime through the Strait.
For Tehran, control of Hormuz is now the top strategic objective. Western intelligence assessments conclude that Tehran is prepared to accept renewed military escalation rather than relinquish control over commercial traffic through the strait.
Despite repeated U.S. strikes against coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile batteries, drone launch positions, and IRGC naval assets, Iran is not backing down on Hormuz. Commercial vessels that refuse to use Tehran’s designated transit routes are under attack, and military pressure is doing nothing to change that as of the time of writing.
At the same time, Iran is busily regrouping and restoring capabilities. U.S. officials now assess that Tehran has replaced portions of its coastal radar network, recovered or repaired hundreds of missiles and launchers damaged during the war, and regained access to more than half of its prewar missile inventory.
Iran lost its diplomatic game when Gulf states and Washington rejected its proposals to formalize Iranian control over Hormuz. Now, rather than closing the strait, it’s attempting to enforce its control by targeting specific vessels, and the U.S. military campaign, so far, is not altering that trajectory.
U.S. strikes have destroyed coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile positions, command nodes, and dozens of IRGC fast attack craft, yet Iranian attacks on commercial shipping have continued. For Iran’s part, the Hormuz campaign doesn’t require much force. Iran does not need to shut Hormuz. It only needs sufficient surviving capability to periodically strike individual commercial vessels, keeping insurance costs elevated while demonstrating that commercial access ultimately depends on Tehran’s consent.
Iran’s strategy doesn’t depend on sustained naval superiority. Periodic attacks against individual ships are sufficient to raise commercial costs, reinforce Iranian leverage, and preserve uncertainty across Gulf energy exports.
Eyes are also now on GCC economic data for the second quarter, which will give us a clearer indication of the damage, with Saudi Arabia and Oman protected by alternative export routes, while Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE are left more exposed. Energy producers benefited from higher prices and managed (to varying degrees of pain) to absorb the logistics pressure.
And then there’s Israel. While the dominant reality is that the U.S.-Iran conflict is now essentially only about Hormuz and who gets to control it, Iran also knows it is justified in using Israeli attacks on and occupation of Lebanon as enough to break the ceasefire. From the outset, this was part of the deal for Tehran. Israel has not complied. Israeli forces remain in southern Lebanon, strikes continue, and the government is still insisting Hezbollah must be dismantled before any final withdrawal. Washington, by contrast, is pushing a political transition in which the Lebanese Armed Forces gradually replace Israeli troops under the June framework. There is no alignment here, and Iran holds more leverage as long as Israel maintains influence to any extent in Washington.
The tens of thousands of Israelis displaced from communities along the Lebanese border have still not returned home and expect the government to ensure Hezbollah cannot resume attacks. This is a major domestic political issue, and Netanyahu is under pressure to produce a working security arrangement. (Residents would like to see him clean up his own mess before they return, and at the moment, they are far from confident.)
Netanyahu’s domestic position is becoming more complicated. A new Channel 13 poll puts former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party ahead of Likud for the first time, while Eisenkot also leads Netanyahu as voters’ preferred prime minister. Elections are expected by late October. Polling results suggest that public support is shifting toward a security figure who backed the war against Hamas but later broke with Netanyahu over its conduct. In other words, Israelis are still prioritizing security, but they don’t necessarily think Netanyahu can provide it.