Analysis: IMO Net-Zero: now-or-never time draws near

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A study for European shipowners puts shipping’s annual EU ETS bill at about €9bn, at €100 a tonne. The same study finds that directive does not oblige member states to send any fixed share of that money back to shipping, and names only France and Estonia as exceptions. Delegates carry that experience into London on Monday, when ISWG-GHG 23 opens and they try again to fix a global carbon price for the same industry. The weak point of the draft a year ago was the money. It still is.

Last year’s blanks, this year’s deadline

The Net-Zero Framework was approved in April 2025. In October, adoption was adjourned by a year, by 57 votes to 49, with 21 abstentions, after US cabinet members threatened visa penalties, port fees, and sanctions against net-zero supporters. ISWG-GHG 22 in September closed without a compromise text. The next window is short: the working group meets from 23 to 27 November, MEPC 85 follows from 30 November, and the extraordinary session is due to resume on 4 December, if MEPC confirms it.

The draft still does not say whether the money sits in an IMO fund or with governments, or under what rules it is distributed. The method for rewarding zero and near-zero fuels is due by 1 March 2027. The $100 and $380 remedial unit prices are fixed only to 2030, and the post-2030 mechanism is due by 1 January 2028. Delegates would vote on a price signal and write the rules for its proceeds afterwards.

Meanwhile, US opposition remains vocal. Laura DiBella, Federal Maritime Commission chair, told the IBIA convention in New York last week that the NZF “cannot be adopted, will never be enforced”.

She added that the US will not accept the IMO fund, and that any financial mechanism should sit under member states’ authority. She further cited FMC analysis putting the fund’s cost to shipping at $53bn to $265bn a year which, frankly, is hard to support – published estimates of its revenue are $10bn to $15bn, and I could not trace the FMC figure to a published method. The FMC’s Section 19 powers include fees of up to $1m a voyage. It has not used them.

Most governments are poorly placed to vote for a new charge on trade now. Brent traded above $100 in September and was near $92 this week, following Gulf disruptions that lifted bunker costs for most of the year. The negotiators are mostly maritime administration officials and secretariat staff who do not face voters. Ministers entered the debate in October 2025, when three US secretaries signed a retaliation statement. That is my reading of the politics, not a poll.

What carriers have already learned

Carriers’ general position rests on two European precedents. The ETS shows what happens to a levy’s proceeds when nothing binds them. The directive requires climate spending in general, not spending on shipping. A carve-out of about 2.5 million allowances applies to maritime in 2026, and it declines each year. The commission’s 2025 Carbon Market Report found member states put around 5% of 2024 revenues into industrial decarbonisation, despite a legal requirement to do so. That figure covers all sectors, but it shows how little a spending rule constrains a treasury.

FuelEU is built the opposite way. Deficit ships pay surplus holders, so the money stays inside shipping and rewards the owners that burned cleaner fuel. It worked for owners that invested, until fuel prices shifted the arithmetic. With VLSFO dearer, B100 in Rotterdam traded $133 a tonne below it on 2 November, which makes surplus cheap to generate. The OceanScore pooling index stood at €180 to €230 a tonne in autumn 2025 and at €80.45 on 2 November. Demand for surplus is fixed by the regulation, so extra supply sets a lower price. ENGINE also cites new sellers and surplus outpacing demand after the summer, so fuel prices are not the only cause.

The NZF takes FuelEU’s promise of a reward and the ETS’s route for the money. Remedial unit payments go to an IMO fund, and the zero and near-zero reward is paid from that fund by a method not yet written. A reward set after the vote, on a price that can fall as FuelEU’s did, is a risk carriers would be accepting in advance. The sovereign alternative that Washington prefers is the ETS model again.

The strongest objection

IMO regimes are usually finished after adoption, and waiting for perfect text means no framework.

Without one, Brussels keeps its own rules. FuelEU’s review clause requires an evaluation by the end of 2027, and the ETS directive requires a EC report on wider coverage, if there is no global measure by 2028. A level playing field is a fair demand, and it is the carriers’ best argument for adopting something.

It does not settle the question of whose money this is.

A framework with no rules for its proceeds is global in name only. Carriers would still face the ETS and FuelEU, since the deduction mechanics in the commission’s July proposals remain unclear, and they would have no vote on the fund. States vote at the IMO. Industry has consultative status and no vote. The useful ask is narrower than adoption or rejection: written fund rules, a reward method and a post-2030 price path, delivered before the vote.

Without them, “global or nothing” can deliver a global levy on top of the regional ones, with no say over where any of it goes.

 

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